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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendants appeal from an Order Denying Motions for New Trial dated 
September 29, 2000, issued by the Honorable K. L. Mclff, Sixth Judicial District 
Court in and for Kane County, State of Utah. 
Plaintiff cross-appeals from that same Order. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0), the 
case having been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court correct in ruling that the 1997 transfer of an 
undivided one-half interest in the westerly 60 feet of the 50-foot strip gave Plaintiff 
an "undisputavle (sic) physical abutment" between the 16.5-foot prescriptive 
easement and Plaintiffs property? See R. at 820, Finding # 37. 
2. Did the reservation of the 60-foot easement by Kanab Creek 
Ranchos, Inc., create a valid easement? See Order beginning at R. 803, 
Judgment beginning at R. 828, and Order beginning at R. 879. 
3. Is the 60-foot easement created by Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc., 
transferable? See Order beginning at R. 803, Judgment beginning at R. 828, and 
Order beginning at R. 879. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff does not contest the trial court's findings of fact, only its 
conclusions of law. The question of whether or not an easement exists is a 
conclusion of law. Potter v. Chadaz. 1999 UT App 095, 977 P.2d 533. Plaintiff 
submits that the classification of an easement is also a conclusion of law. A trial 
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, and no particular 
deference is accorded to them. Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 
1998). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no controlling constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed suit to enforce an express 60-foot easement across the 
westerly boundary of Defendants' residential real property. Plaintiff also sought to 
establish the easement by prescription. Defendants claimed that the reservation 
of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiffs predecessor did not create a valid 
easement, and denied the existence of any easement by prescription. 
The trial court ruled, via pre-trial partial summary judgment, that the 
reservation of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiffs predecessor did not create a 
valid easement, and that the transfer of the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff was 
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therefore ineffectual. 
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff had a valid 16.5-foot 
easement by prescription across Defendants' residential lot. 
Defendants appealed, not by challenging the existence of the prescriptive 
easement, but only by claiming that Plaintiff is not an abutting landowner who can 
utilize the prescriptive easement. 
Plaintiff cross-appealed, contesting the trial court's rulings as to the 60-foot 
easement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff owns real property that lies to the north of Defendants' 
residential real property ("Lot 32"). R. at 825, Finding #13. A survey map of the 
area is included in the Addendum at Item A. Plaintiffs real property is identified 
on the survey map as K-19-8 Annex. 
2. Lot 32 was originally created in 1971 by Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc. 
("KCRI"), a corporate developer, as part of Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision 
Unit 1. R. at 826, Finding #8. 
3. KCRI transferred Lot 32 to Wayne and Sharon Weaver via Warranty 
Deed dated March 1,1977. The Warranty Deed, a copy of which is included in 
the Addendum at Item B, included this language: "Subject to a sixty (60) foot wide 
roadway easement along the West boundary". The Warranty Deed was recorded 
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on March 2,1977. R. at 822, Findings #29 and #30, and Addendum Item B. 
4. At the time of the Warranty Deed and reservation, KCRI did not have 
any ownership interest in the real property n i im nmlh m I ol M and never 
obtained any ownership interest in that property. R. at 802, Finding #1. 
5. Defendants acquired Lot 32 at a foreclosure sale, via Trustee's Deed 
dated February 12, 1990. R. at 826, Finding #7. 
6. KCRI transferred the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff via Quit-Claim 
Deed in 1996. R. at 801, Conclusion #1. 
7. In 1997, Plaintiff acquired an undivided one-half interest in lie 
westerly 60 feel I |f,f M,' liml slii| immediately north of Lot 32. R. at 820, 
Finding #37, Addendum at F. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Having acquired an undivided one-half interest in the westerly 60 
feet of the 50-foot strip immediately north of Lot 32, Plaintiff is an abutting 
landowner. 
POINT II. The reservation of the 60-foot easement by KCRI in the March 
1,1977 Warranty Deed created a valid easement. 
POINT III I hr.- IMI•',-.(<• i MI Hi. hi I fool. 'dsement from KCRI to Plaintiff in 




HAVING ACQUIRED AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE 
WESTERLY 60 FEET OF THE 50-FOOT STRIP IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF 
LOT 32, PLAINTIFF IS AN ABUTTING LANDOWNER 
Defendants' argue that Plaintiffs property does not abut the prescriptive 
easement, and that the trial court therefore erred in decreeing the prescriptive 
easement in favor of the Plaintiff. Without conceding that abutment is required. 
Defendant submits that it is an abutting landowner. On May 22,1997, Garkane 
Power Association, Inc., granted Plaintiff an undivided one-half interest in the 
west 60 feet of the 50-foot strip immediately north of Lot 32. See Addendum at F. 
This act made Plaintiff an abutting landowner. See R. at 820, Finding #37; R. at 
825, Finding #13; and Rosenberg Associates' Survey Map at Addendum A. 
The cases cited in Defendants' Brief do not support Defendants' specific 
position in this appeal. In Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc.. 468 P.2d 372 (Utah 1970), 
both the trial court and the majority of the Supreme Court determined that 
Plaintiffs' property never abutted the abandoned county roadway. In Mawson v. 
J. G. Investment Co.. 464 P.2d 595 (Utah 1970), both the trial court and the 
majority of the Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiffs use of his undivided one-fifth 
interest in the roadway was limited to those lots he owned along the roadway, 
and that he could not use the roadway to access subsequently acquired property 
which never did abut the roadway. In the present case, however, abutment 
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OCCIII red when Plaintiff acquired the one-half interest in the westerly 60 feet of the 
50-foot strip. Wood v. Ashbv, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), by its own terms, does 
not address the issue before this Court. In Wood, an ingress/egress easement 
had been reserved across Wood's property in an identifiable location. The 
Supreme Court noted: 
The question raised by this assignment, it should be noted, is not 
whether Christensen, should he secure access thereto, may use the 
decreed restricted way for ingress and egress. Indeed [Wood] 
indicates in his brief that he would have no objection to his doing so. 
Rather, Christensen (Ashby's successor) sought to obtain a separate 
access across Wood's property. Both the trial couii mil n*' Supieme i nmi MIIK! 
thai Chrisiensen was nni entitled to the additional access. 
To the extent that Plaintiff here is required to be an abutting landowner, he 
became an abutting landowner by acquisition of the one-half undivided interest in 
the westerly i ii l IM-M I H IIHJ SO-fool snip 
POINT II 
THE RESERVATION OF THE 60-FOOT EASEMENT BY KCRI IN THE 
MARCH 1, 1977 WARRANTY DEED CREATED A VALID EASEMENT 
In Utah, an easement may be created by agreement between two parties 
through an express reservation. Potter v. Chadaz. fl8 I < > create a valid 
easemenl by reservation, the language in the subject document must show the 
intention to create an easement, and must be certain and definite. Id. at ^9. The 
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language in the March 1, 1977 Warranty Deed from KCRI to the Weavers is 
sufficient to create a valid easement. Both the intent to create the easement, and 
the location of the easement, are set forth in the simple but clear language, 
"Subject to a sixty (60) foot wide roadway easement along the West boundary" of 
Lot 32, Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision Unit 1. 
The trial court, as indicated in the findings of fact drafted by Mr. 
Mackelprang (R. at 802), incorrectly ruled that the reservation did not create a 
valid easement because KCRI did not own the property to the north of Lot 32 at 
the time of the reservation. 
However, ownership of an abutting dominant estate is not required to 
create a valid easement. While an appurtenant easement is "incapable of 
existence separate from the particular land to which it is annexed," an easement 
in gross "is not tied to any particular piece of land." Johnson v. Hiqlev, 1999 UT 
App 278,1J13, 989 P.2d 61. Where the parties claiming an easement did not own 
real property adjoining the land over which the easement was claimed, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that the easement is an easement in gross. Crane v. 
Crane. 683 P.2d 1062,1064 (Utah 1984). Finally, "[t]he primary distinction 
between an easement in gross and an easement appurtenant is that in the latter 
there is, and in the former there is not, a dominant estate to which the easement 
is attached." Nelson v. Johnson. 679 P.2d 662, 664 (Idaho 1984). In this case, 
the March 1,1977 Warranty Deed reserved a valid easement in gross to KCRI. 
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POINT III 
THE TRANSFER OF THE 60-FOOT EASEMENT 
FROM KCRI TO PLAINTIFF IN 1996 WAS ALSO VALID 
There are two types of easements in gross - personal easements in gross, 
and commercial easements in gross. Although personal easements in gross 
cannot be transferred, commercial easement, m UIDSS "have been held 
transferable almost without exception from early times." Johnson v. Hiqiev, TJ15. 
An easement in gross is commercial in nature when its authorized use "results 
primarily in economic benefit rather than personal satisfaction." Id a\ tf15. 
In the present case, the trial court recognized that KCRI's reservation was an 
attempt to provide better access to the property north of Lot 32 in the event that 
KCRI should ever acquire that property. R. at 821, 822, Findings #29 
was not retainei II In M •• i H ises as "aesthetics, a hobby, or personal 
recreation." ]d. atfl16. 
CONCLUSION 
The decree of the trial court quieting title in a 16.5-foot prescriptive 
easement in favor Plaintiff should be affirmed. However, the decisions of the trial 
court, as to the invalidity «.l II i.; uealnni and transfer of the 60-foot easement, 
should be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2001. 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Appellee / Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Initial Brief of Appellee / 
Cross-Appellant were mailed by first class mail this 26th day of March, 2001 to: 
VAN MACKELPRANG 
328 W. Kanab Creek Drive 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
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ADDENDUM 
Item Description Record Location 
A Survey Map 
B Warranty Deed from KCRI 
C Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 800 to 803 
Law 
D Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 811 to 828 
Judgment Quieting Title 
E Order Denying Motions for New Trial 877 to 870 
F Quitclaim Deed (from Garkane to Plaintiff) 
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WH.V - ' * E C 0 1 \ > \ MAIL TO: _ 
Kanab Creek Ronchos, Inc . j 
Box l«17 
J5!^^.t#..H.5?.7!fi s l M , , r A,K,VC r<,r neconlcr'a U*c 
Harrattfy JDi^ i 
(Corporate Form) 
KARAB CREEK RANCH03, IflC. , * torporation 
orranlied and exlslln* under the lawr vi Ihr U»l< ul Utah, with Hi principal office at 
25 W. Kanab Creek Dr.
 # of County of Kane . s u l c o f u u h » 
trantor, hereby conveys and warrants to 
WAXNE WEAVER and SIIARCH K. WEAVER, Husband and Wife, Joint Tcnonto v i t h F a l l 
Rights of flurvivorshlp, end not as Tenants in Caiuaon 
Grantee 
of Kanab, Ul tor the sum of 
Ten and no/100 (and other valuable considerations) DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land In Kane County, 
SUte of Utah: 
LOT #32 
TRACT 8 31*, WIT I 
KAIIAB CREEK RAHCHOS SUBDIVISION 
KAHAJ, UT O h ^ l 
Subject to eaaements and r ights of vay IJII record inK&ne County, 
W u l ^ e t r t r ^ H ^ i i ^ 7 ^ 6 o ) ^ f ^ 
The officers who aim this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer repreiented 
thereby was duly aulhorited under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor 
at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused Us corporate name and if ul In be hereunto affixed 
by Its duly authorized officers this f i r s t day of March A. D., 19 77 , 
Attest: |K/WAB CREEK HAHCIJDO, BfC, Company 
nr ~" 
.•VCorpyratf Seal) 
. STATEi Of ITCAH, 
Secretary. A&1&. ?£&*& 
I)<ilc E. ClArksoti riesident 
* ':? M»-l {&&!£'<•; 
Kane 
•ts 
"• '• T?9.U»e f l r a t d*r of Marcli , A. D. 1977 
personal]/ appeared before me Dale E. Clark noil nnd n i l l i p R« Onolgrotc 
who belnr by me duly iwoin did aay, each for himself, that he, the laid D*lii E« Claikioa 
Is the president, and he, the said Phi l ip R. Onelgrov* Is the iccrcUry 
of Kanab Cretk Ranchos, Inc . Company, and that tha within and foregoing 
Initrument was aljned In behalf of ttid corporation by authority ot a resolution ol Its board of dlroc-
tort and aald Dale K. ClArkaoa and Ttfyip JR. *o«lfcro\r« 
each duly acknowledged to me that aald « xjxxali »n ttu ulrd the umn *n4 Uurt tks a*aJ afflxtd 
I 1 r 
VAN MACKELPRANG (5996) 
MICHAEL W.PARK (2516) 
THE PARK FIRM, P.C. 
376 E. Sunland Dr., #1 
P.O. Box 2438 
St. George, UT 84771 





DEC 2 3 1998
 D|QA o/fetft 
Clerk 
SIXTH DISTRICT C O U ^ T H D I S T RICT COURT 
ClerK 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG, 
KANAB CREEK RANCHOS, INC., 
And JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant(s). 
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG, 
Counter-Claimant(s), 
vs. 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Counter-Claim Defendant(s). 
ORDER, FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge K.L. Mclff 
Case No. 960600070 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the 
parties respective Motion's tor Partial Siimmaiy .Judgements, the Honorable K.L. Mclff, 
District Court Judge, presiding. The Cross-Claimant Jamie Mackelprang was not present 
but was represented personally by attorney Van Mackelprang and Plaintiff LaDell Alvey 
was present personally and was represented by attorney Todd Macfarlane. The court, 
heard statements, and argument(s) from counsel. The Court, being fully advised in the 
premises, having considered pending motions, statements and arguments of counsel, and 
for good cause shown, hereby finds that the following are undisputed facts: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court Finds that the undisputed evidence is that the attempted 
reservation of the of the sixty (60) foot easement arose from the conveyance of lot 32, 
subsequent to the plating and subdivision effort. That at the time of the attempted 
reservation the grantors who attempted to reserve the sixty (60) foot easement did not 
have an ownership interest in the land to the North or the property referred to as the 
"Jameson " property. The Court finds that the attempted reservation of said easement 
was not for the benefit of the land North or the subdivision and that in either event it 
could have been shown on the plat map. The Court finds that it was created solely for 
the benefit of creating a situation which would give Clarkson and Snelgrove a position 
of leverage in the property to the North and which could not be utilized by anyone but 
said defendants and the legal effect of the attempted reservation is null and void. It did 
not create an appurtenant easement, nor did it create an easement in gross, because it 
had nothing to attach and could not be utilized in any meaningful way. The only 
meaningful way it could be utilized was by acquiring the property northward, which said 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 1^01 in II ie loieyoinq i indinqs ol Fact the Court, concludes that said reservation 
did not create an easement or right and that the Quit-claim deed to Alvey in 1996, 
passed no right. The Court Concludes tl tat it was r lot possible foi defendants to elevate 
the easement to a higher level than when they attempted to created it. 
Due to the fact that the Court has concluded that the attempted reserved 
easement is a legal nullity, the Court does not need reach a legal conclusion in 
response to the protective covenants. The Court will not resolve all the issues 
concerning the restrictive covet lai its ai id considers those issues still open and does not 
need to resolve them, because of the way the court has ruled on the sixty (60) foot 
claim of reservation. j 
DATED this day of December, 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
K.L 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT: 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp. 
d 
VAN MACKELPRANG 
Attorney for Litigants Mackelprang 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was hand delivered, on the £g£"aay of December, 1998, to: 
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp. 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER. 
76 North Main St. 
Kanab, UT. 84741. 
Van Mackelprang 
/ h Y)^(^\ 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156 
FILED 
kAM= COUhtrv 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE 
Case No. 960600070 
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial on July 
20, 1998, pursuant to the claims and counterclaims of the 
respective parties, Judge K. L. Mclff, District Court Judge, 
presiding. Following the trial, and after hearing testimony, 
receiving evidence, and hearing arguments from counsel, the Court 
made findings and rulings from the bench. The Court requested 
that Plaintiffs' then counsel, Todd Macfarlane, prepare written 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment Quieting 
Title. 
Mr. Macfarlane prepared a document that included findings, 
conclusions, and a judgment, and Defendants filed certain 
1 
objections thereto. Those objections came before the Court for 
decision on December 23, 1998. Plaintiff LaDell Alvey was 
present, and was represented by new counsel for all Plaintiffs, 
Colin R. Winchester. Defendant Van Mackelprang was present, both 
in an individual capacity, and as counsel for all Defendants. 
The Court reviewed the objections, and ordered specified changes 
to the proposed Judgment Quieting Title submitted by Mr. 
Macfarlane. Based on the foregoing, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, Alvey Development Corporation, ("Alvey 
Development"), owns property located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah, 
which is more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet 
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32 
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line 
between said section, and running thence East 255.39 
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East 
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06' West 1577.9 feet; 
thence North 88°54,44" West 832.86 feet; thence South 
0°09'33" East 1612 feet to beginning. 
2. Alvey Development acquired the subject property from 
Garkane Power Association by deed dated November 3, 1987. 
3. Garkane Power Association acquired the subject 
property, including the above-described Alvey parcel, as part of 
a larger 50-acre parcel from Afton Jameson, by deed dated 
November 21, 1986. 
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4. Jameson and her late husband, Karl Jameson, acquired 
the above-described parcel from Sytha Church by deed dated 
October 11, 1958. 
5. Prior to Jamesons, the subject property belonged to the 
Church family, including Jack and Sytha Church, since at least 
1939. 
6. Defendants Van and Jamie Mackelprang likewise own 
property located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah, hereafter referred 
to as the "Mackelprang Property", or "Lot 32", which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 32, TRACT S 34, UNIT 1, KANAB CREEK RANCHOS 
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof on 
file in the office of the County Recorder of Kane 
County, State of Utah. 
7. Mackelprangs acquired their property at foreclosure 
sale, by Trustee's Deed dated February 12, 1990. 
8. Prior to Mackelprangs' acquisition of Lot 32, the 
property now constituting Lot 32 had been subdivided in 1971 by 
Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "KCR") a 
corporate developer whose primary principals include Dale 
Clarkson and Philip Snelgrove. 
9. KCR acquired the subject property, including what is 
now Lot 32, from Kenyon and Anna May Little, by deed dated July 
23, 1970, as part of a larger 10-acre parcel. 
10. Littles acquired the subject 10-acre parcel from Mrs. 
Little's father, Clair Ford, by deed dated August 5, 1964. 
3 
11. Although the "Little/Ford" property had been owned by 
Clair Ford's father, John, for many years, Clair Ford acquired 
the subject property by redeeming it following Tax Sale, by Tax 
Deed dated May 31, 1957. 
12. Lot 32 is located entirely within the 10-acre parcel 
that constitutes the Little/Ford property. 
13. The subject Alvey property adjoins the subject 
Mackelprang property, as more fully shown on the survey plat 
prepared by Rosenberg & Associates dated January 24, 1997, with 
the Alvey property on the north, and Lot 3 2 on the south. A copy 
of such survey is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
14. The subject properties are divided by a fence running 
between, which has been in place in the same location, since at 
least 1958. 
15. The fence includes a gate between the respective 
properties, approximately 14 feet in width, which is located 
approximately 25 feet east of the northwesterly corner of Lot 32, 
as depicted in Exhibit "A". 
16. The gate has been in the same location, in the fence, 
since at least 1958, when the Alvey property was owned by the 
Jameson family, and the Mackelprang property was owned by 
Ford(s). 
17. According to the evidence presented at trial, dating 
back at least as early as the 193 0s, there was an access road 
along the west side of Kanab Creek, which crossed both the Alvey 
4 
and Mackelprang properties, and passed through the gate in the 
fence dividing the two properties. 
18. Although such road and gate were accessible 
periodically from Kanab on the north, based on varying conditions 
of Kanab Creek, it was more readily accessible from the south, 
where there were several more reliable creek crossings, near the 
location of the present Kanab Airport. 
19. Based on the evidence presented, there has been 
continuity of historical agricultural use pre-existing either of 
the present parties, going back at least as early as 193 9, but 
the primary evidence of such use focused more on the time period 
since 1958. 
20. Since at least 1939, however, when the Church family 
owned the subject Alvey property, continuing through 1958 when 
Jamesons acquired the subject Alvey property, and throughout the 
duration of their ownership, the subject Alvey property was 
historically used for agricultural purposes. 
21. Although the precise nature of such agriculture use(s), 
including livestock numbers, densities, etc., are not entirely 
clear based on the evidence presented, such use(s) included 
livestock numbers and densities of up to five horses and ten 
cows, but often averaged less that that, with an average of three 
horses and three cows. 
22. Alveys' predecessors in interest, including Jamesons, 
utilized the access across Lot 32 to the Alvey/Jameson property, 
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particularly for vehicular access, to tend and care for their 
livestock, and engage in agricultural use(s) of the property. 
23. Although it is not possible, based on the evidence 
presented, to precisely define the exact extent of the use of the 
access across what is now Lot 32, it was used when necessary or 
desired by the subject owners, as dictated by their agricultural 
needs. In other words, they used the access easement when 
necessary or desirable to tend, care for and use their horses and 
livestock. Such use was regular and constant in the sense that 
livestock were usually on the property. It was sporadic in the 
sense that livestock were not always there, and did not always 
require exactly the same level of attention, use, or care. In 
addition, not only were livestock kept, and cared for there, but 
they were also used on the subject property, for agricultural 
purposes, which included recreational horses riding on the 
subject and surrounding property. 
24. There were times when such use(s) occurred on a regular 
daily basis, and other times when such use(s) occurred on a 
weekly or even monthly basis, all according to the need(s) at the 
time. 
25. Such uses continued until approximately 1985 when Mr. 
Jameson died and the Jamesons established a second residence in 
Las Vegas. 
26. By 1985, access to the Alvey property across what is 
now Lot 32 had been well established by prescriptive use for a 
period well in excess of 20 years, going back as far as 1939. 
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Such use was open, notorious, and adverse. There is no credible 
evidence that the use was ever permissive. 
27. In 1970, when what is now Lot 32 was acquired by KCR, 
the access route across the property was open, notorious, and 
apparent on the ground. It had been apparent on the ground for 
many years prior to that, dating back to at least 1958 when 
Jamesons acquired the subject Alvey property. 
28. The Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision was platted in 
approximately 1971. 
29. Sometime after the subdivision was platted and 
recorded, KCR principals became aware that the access they 
witnessed and observed on the ground was apparently the only 
reasonable vehicular access to the Jameson property. 
Consequently, when KCR sold Lot 3 2 in 1977, it undertook or 
attempted to reserve a 60-foot roadway access easement across the 
westerly 60-feet of Lot 32, in apparent recognition of the prior 
existence of the subject access easement, and based on a 
purported desire to provide better access to such property if 
they should ever acquire it, and/or provide for better access 
planning in the general area. 
30. Consequently, the original conveyance of Lot 32 to its 
original owners, Weavers, in 1977, included reference to the 
subject 60-foot roadway easement. 
31. KCR did not attempt to create the easement for the 
specific benefit of Jamesons, or the Jameson Property. It did so 
because*KCR principals contemplated the possibility of eventually 
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acquiring the Jameson property and because they considered such 
access to be consistent with an effort to enhance general 
planning for access in the general area. 
32. KCR's attempted reference to and/or attempted creation 
of a broader easement, however, did not constitute any form of 
permission to use the pre-existing prescriptive easement. 
33. From that time forward, Jamesons had a consciousness of 
both sources (i.e., the attempted express easement as well as the 
pre-existing prescriptive easement), as a basis for possible 
access to their property, and attempted to broaden their 
prescriptive access right(s) by attempting to use and take 
advantage of the purported express easement, reflected in the 
recorded Weaver deed, Consequently, they notified Weaver's 
successor in interest, the Smiths, that they were relying on the 
purported 60-foot easement, for access to the property, and that 
they claimed a right to use and rely upon the express 60-foot 
easement referred to in the Weaver Deed. 
34. Despite such assertion(s), however, Jamesons did not 
broaden or increase their actual use of the easement. 
35. In 1986, after Garkane acquired the Jamesons' property, 
Garkane designed and built an electrical power transmission line 
across the easterly portion of the Jameson property, continuing 
to utilize the established access easement across Lot 32, as 
necessary for access to their property. Because of the price 
Jameson was asking for the property at the time, which Garkane 
found unacceptable, LaDell Alvey who was acting as an independent 
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contractor for Garkane at the time, negotiated an arrangement 
with Garkane whereby he would purchase any remaining portion of 
the subject Jameson property which Garkane did not need. Garkane 
made that determination in 1987, and deeded the balance of the 
subject property, including approximately 3 0 acres, to Alvey 
Development. 
36. In the process of deeding and conveying the subject 
property to Alvey, Garkane retained a strip along the north side 
of the Jameson property and a strip along the south side, to 
provide access to its own property across the remaining Alvey 
property. The strip along the south side was designed to reach 
and include the 60-foot access easement, across Lot 32, which 
Garkane considered at the time to be a valid access easement. 
37. Although there is some discrepancy between the plat 
Garkane relied upon at the time of its effort to convey the 
subject property to Alveys and the later survey plat prepared by 
Rosenburg & Associates, which shows the 50-foot strip running to 
the northwest corner of Lot 32 and essentially covering the 
entire width of the purported 60-foot roadway easement, any such 
discrepancy is irrelevant and immaterial because in 1997, Garkane 
conveyed to Alvey Development an undivided one-half interest in 
that portion of the Garkane property covering the entire westerly 
60-foot wide portion of the 50-foot strip, which resulted in 
undisputavle physical abutment between the prescriptive easement 
and the Alvey property. 
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38. Such conveyance was in accordance with the 
understanding and intention of the parties at the time, Alvey and 
Garkane, who intended that they would both have good and 
sufficient access to their respective properties, across Lot 32, 
from Kanab Creek Drive. 
39. The gate and the fence between the subject properties, 
have been in place throughout the entire history evidenced in 
this case, at least since 1958 and continuing up to the present. 
Although sometimes the gate was closed and sometimes it was open, 
the gate always remained in the same location and provided access 
to the subject Alvey property. 
40. Although there may have been some slight deviation in 
the exact route of the access or approach across Lot 32 to the 
gate, for at least 20 years, such access has been located within 
the westerly-most 60-feet of what is now Lot 32, always merging 
at the gate between the respective properties. 
41. At all times from at least 1958, the use was adverse 
and was not permissive. 
42. After Garkane acquired the subject Alvey property in 
1986, and Alvey acquired the same in 1987, they continued to use 
the subject access easement openly, notoriously, and adversely, 
because any previous attempt to create an express easement across 
the westerly 60-feet across the westerly 60-feet of Lot 32 was 
legally ineffectual and invalid. 
43. Mackelprangs acquired Lot 32 in 1990, when Van 
Mackelprang was in law school. 
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44. Based on its obvious appearance on the ground, and 
reference to an easement in the previous chain of title to Lot 
32, Mackelprangs had constructive notice and either knew or 
should have known that there was at least a possibility of an 
easement across the property. 
45. Although Mackelprangs subsequently researched issues 
regarding the attempted creation of the express 60 foot roadway 
easement, and determined that, in their opinion, it did not 
create a valid easement, their conclusions did not affect the 
prescriptive easement, and any use thereof following 
Mackelprangs1 acquisition of Lot 32 was likewise non-permissive. 
46. Although Mackelprangs may not have observed any use of 
the subject access easement after they acquired Lot 32, there has 
been some use since their acquisition. Such uses continued in 
the early 1990s, after Mackelprangs acquired Lot 32, but ended in 
approximately 1994 when the Mackelprang improvements on Lot 32 
became such that it was no longer possible to continue to use the 
subject easement without damaging such improvements. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant(s) Mackelprangs' property, Lot 32, Kanab Creek 
Ranchos Subdivision, as more fully described herein is subject to 
a valid, legally enforceable prescriptive easement, located 
within the westerly 60 feet of such property, established by 
open, notorious, and adverse use of the subject easement by Alvey 
Development and its predecessors, for the use and benefit of the 
adjoining Alvey property, as more fully described herein, for a 
period in excess of 20 years, for agricultural purposes. 
2. Any subsequent change of use(s) of the subject property, 
by Garkane or Alvey, have been of such short duration that they 
have not affected or changed the nature of the historical use of 
the subject prescriptive easement. 
3. Although the prescriptive easement at issue is separate 
and distinct from any purported attempt to create or reserve any 
broader express access easement across the westerly 60 feet of 
Lot 32, KCR's attempt to create or convey a valid 60 foot roadway 
easement was legally ineffectual. Although such reference may in 
fact constitute an easement in gross, belonging to KCR, and/or 
its principals, which is not appurtenant to any other property, 
as a personal easement in gross, it cannot be alienated, 
assigned, or conveyed to any other party. 
4. Although it is not possible to define the precise 
location and route of the subject prescriptive easement, any such 
inability has.resulted from Mackelprangs' actions and 
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improvements, which have obliterated present signs of the precise 
location and route of the subject easement. Consequently, 
Mackelprangs should be estopped from complaining of the exact, 
precise location within the 60-feet, because it was their own 
acts, placement and improvements in landscaping, etc., that have 
obliterated physical signs of the easement and its precise route. 
5. Likewise, because of Mackelprangs' conclusion that the 
express easement was invalid, they should also be estopped from 
claiming that any continued use of the easement after they 
acquired the subject property was not adverse. 
6. Any lapse of time since 1994, the last actual use of the 
prescriptive easement, and December 5, 1996, the date of filing 
of this action, has been insufficient to extinguish the 
prescriptive rights of Alvey Development, because there has not 
been any intentional abandonment by Alvey Development. 
7. On the other hand, there has been an intentional 
abandonment of such rights by Garkane Power Association, by 
virtue of documents it filed with the Court expressly disclaiming 
and abandoning any further right or interest to use the subject 
property (Lot 32) for access to the Garkane property. 
8. Despite such abandonment by Garkane, however, the Alvey 
and Garkane uses of the subject prescriptive easement are 
separate and independent, and Garkane's abandonment in no way 
affects Alveys1 continued legal right to continue to use and rely 
upon the prescriptive easement across Lot 32. 
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9. Consequently, Alvey Development is entitled to a decree 
recognizing and quieting title to a valid and legally enforceable 
prescriptive easement for the benefit of the following described 
property: 
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet 
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32 
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line 
between said section, and running thence East 255.39 
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East 
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06I West 1577.9 feet; 
thence North 88°54'44" West 832.86 feet; thence South 
0°09!33n East 1612 feet to beginning. 
10. Such easement is located within the westerly 60 feet of 
Lot 32. If such easement remains unfenced, its width should be 
ten feet. If the easement is fenced, the access lane created by 
such fence, if any, should be one rod (i.e., 16.5 feet) in width. 
The decision as to whether to fence the easement shall be made by 
the Mackelprangs. 
11. Although the Mackelprangs should be entitled to define 
the exact location of the easement within the westerly 60-feet of 
Lot 32, they should not do so in such a way that does not provide 
a reasonably straight access and approach to the gate located 
between the respective properties, but otherwise may relocate the 
easement anywhere within the westerly 60-feet with sufficient 
adjustments for widths and allowances for turns, etc., such that 
it may be fully utilized consistent with its historic use(s) 
through the subject gate. 
12. Said prescriptive easement may be used to serve the 
agricultural purposes of the subject Alvey property, which shall 
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be limited to the nature, scope and extent of historic use, as 
reasonably necessary to care for not more than five horses nor 
ten head of cattle, with an average of three horses and three 
cows, but includes every use that is reasonably necessary or 
required to care for, feed, water, use and utilize such livestock 
on the subject property, including vehicular transportation to 
and from such property. This statement of limitation should in 
no way limit the nature and use of the Alvey property, but only 
serves to define limitations on the use of the prescriptive 
easement across Lot 32 which provides access to such property. 
13. Alvey Development should also be entitled to maintain 
and conduct such reasonable improvements, including but not 
limited to grading, drainage, and maintenance of the driving 
surface, as may be necessary for reasonable continued use and 
utilization of the subject access easement for the defined 
historical uses. 
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ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DEGREE 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff Alvey Development Corporation is hereby 
awarded judgment in the form of a decree quieting title to a 
valid, and fully enforceable prescriptive easement 10-feet in 
width, or up to 16.5 feet in feet in width if the subject 
easement is fenced at the election of the Mackelprangs, located 
within the westerly 60-feet of Lot 32, Kanab Creek Ranchos 
Subdivision according to the official plat thereof, for the use 
and -benefit of the following described property: 
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet 
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32 
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line 
between said section, and running thence East 255.39 
feet; thence North 0o06' West 50 feet; thence East 
576.04 feet; thence North 0o06' West 1577.9 feet; 
thence North 88°54»44" West 832.86 feet; thence South 
0°09,33" East 1612 feet to beginning. 
2. The subject easement shall be appurtenant to and run 
with the subject properties, with Lot 32 fully subject to the 
prescriptive easement, as the "servient estate", for the benefit 
of the above-described Alvey Property, which is the "dominant 
estate". 
3. Use of such easement shall be limited to the historical 
nature, extent, burden and scope of use as more fully described 
above, together with any reasonable, necessary efforts to improve 
and/or maintain the surface to facilitate the utilization 
thereof. 
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4. Subject to the uses and parameters set forth above, 
Defendants Mackelprang shall not do anything to thwart, 
interfere, or inhibit Plaintiff Alveys1 use and utilization of 
the subject easement for the stated purposes. 
DATED t h i s M JL day of C T O B B g ^ 1999 
BY THE COURT: 
K. L. M 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 24th day of September, 1999, I served 
a true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT 
QUIETING TITLE to each person listed below: 
VAN MACKELPRANG (via hand delivery) 
126 East 100 South 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the l$<h day of H0\f#U*jh^r' , 1999, I 
served a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT 
QUIETING TITLE to each person listed below: 
VAN MACKELPRANG (via f-abrot class nfaU) 
126 East 100 South 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
(JUkl^iyliJ^K 
T> 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 960600070 
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court on December 20, 1999, 
pursuant to Plaintiff's motion for a new trial and Defendants' 
motion for a new trial. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, 
Colin R. Winchester. Defendants were represented by counsel, Van 
Mackelprang. The parties argued their respective positions. The 
Court had read the parties' various memoranda, heard the parties' 
arguments, and was fully advised in the premises. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
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1. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, based on alleged 
inconsistencies in the two sets of Findings of Fact, is denied. 
The easement is neither a personal easement in gross nor a 
commercial easement in gross. Any inconsistency in the two sets 
of Findings of Fact on that issue is governed by this Order. 
2. Defendants' motion for a new trial, based on 
irregularity in the proceedings and newly discovered evidence, is 
denied. The testimony contained in the affidavits submitted is 
not substantial enough to create a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result if a new trial were granted. 
DATED this £) day of ±£i 2000 
BY THE COURT: 
K. Ti. McltfF L. Mclf
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 18th day of September, 2000, I served 
a true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL to each person listed below: 
VAN MACKELPRANG (via hand delivery) 
126 East 100 South 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
WI^IAUM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 2/1 ^f day of October, 2000, I served a 
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL to each person listed below: 
VAN MACKELPRANG (via first class mail) 
126 East 100 South 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
( £ t ^ ^ ^ 
i, 
When recorded, mail to: 
Alvey Development Corp. 
P.O.'Box417 







GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC., Grantor, in exchange for good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged. 
hereby QUITCLAIMS to ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., whose address is P.O. Box 
417, Kanab, Utah 84741, Grantee, an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the following 
described real property situate in Kane County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 327.81 feet North and 255.39 feet East of the 
Quarter Section Corner common to Sections 32 and 33, Township 43 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0°06f 
West 50 feet; thence East 60 feet; thence South 50 feet; thence West 
60 feet, to the point of beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said GRANTOR this ^ P ^ d a v of May, 1997. 











f /?aj e. Ckuj-kr 
By: Carl R. Albrecht 
Its: General Manager 
CO \ Lii I 
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U Q CD 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
On the £LMcL&ay of May, 1997, personally appeared before me Carl R. 
Albrecht, the signer of the foregoing Quitclaim Deed, of behalf of Garkane Power 
Association Inc., with authority, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
--NOTARY PliBJJU^ rfJ! SHELUR.CUR718 
176 M. MAM BOX 7M 
MCHRBUXUTAHSttOt 
COMM. EXP. 10-7-2000 
